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LIABILITY INSURANCE
and wages and salaries without a minimum for subsistence are" all sub-
ject to seizure.
The federal tax lien is wholly a federal creature and "matters di-
rectly affecting the nature or operation of [the lien] are federal ques-
tions, regardless of whether the federal statutory scheme specifically
deals with them or not."' . 7  The language of the statute specifies- that
there shall be a lien on "all property or rights to property" without ex-
ception. s If state law were to govern the attachment, a state could
place recognized property rights beyond the reach of the federal lien
and, thus, produce undesirable vagaries in the federal tax collection ef-
fort. The underlying policy of federal taxation is to insure as much
uniformity as possible.5 9 By permitting federal law to govern, courts
would be able "to subject to the lien the wide range of property inter-
ests commanded by the sweeping language of the statute, as well as to
exclude some interests as not being within the statutory purpose."60
In recent years, Congress has shown a tendancy to expand the cate-
gory of property exempt under section 6334(a).6 ' Hopefully, it will
recognize the need for uniformity with respect to protection of the home-
stead and expand section 6334(a) to include- provisions similar. to the
more progressive state homestead exemptions.
STUART T. WiL Ams
Liability Insurance-The Movable Link Between Coverage Denial
and Settlement Offers
Insurance litigation has produced uncertainty about a carrier's
obligations when its insured has caused damages beyond policy limits;
the insurer denies coverage to its insured because it believes, in good.
-56. Antrum v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 54 (D. Conn. i953).
57.. United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 240 (1960). The Court, however,
recognized that when "Congress resorted to the use of liens, it came into an area of
complex property relationships long since settled and regulated by state law." Thus
the Court felt that in regards to divestiture of federal tax liens, -where there existed
well-established state procedures, state law should be adopted as a matter of federal
policy. Id. at 241-42. But see Comment, 25 Sw. L.J., supra note 38, at 460 n.43.
58. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321, quoted in note 3 supra.
59. E.g., United States v. Gilbert Associates, Txc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953); Burnet
v. Hamel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
60. Comment, 77 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 17, at 1503.
61. See 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 13, at § 49.192.
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faith, that the policy does not apply; and the injured party then of-
fers settlement.' At least one jurisdiction2 has held that the insur-
ance company must either accept "reasonable settlement offers,"'
despite grounds for disclaiming coverage, or face liability in excess of
policy limits if a subsequent suit determines that coverage exists. 4
Confusion has arisen because other jurisdictions, although purport-
ingly rejecting this strictly liable rule, still impose excess liability on
companies that have rejected settlement following a good faith denial
of coverage. The purpose of this note is to show how courts are
reaching this excess liability result and to suggest measures insurers
can take to avoid it.
The dangers of excess liability in connection with coverage denial
and settlement refusal were demonstrated in Luke v. American Family
Mutual Insurance Co.5 American issued a 50,000 dollar automobile
accident policy. The insured, intoxicated and driving on the wrong
side of the road, collided with the plaintiffs' car, killing one person and
injuring two. American did not dispute the material facts of the acci-
dent, but its thorough investigation disclosed a coverage exclusion de-
1. This note is concerned with the following series of events: (1) the insured
is clearly at fault in causing an accident which results in damages in excess of policy
limits; (2) the insurance company denies coverage and refuses to defend because it
believes in good faith that the claim is outside the scope of the policy or that the
insured has failed to comply with policy terms; (3) the injured party sues the insured
but before final judgment offers the insurance carrier settlement within policy limits;
(4) the insurer declines settlement; (5) the injured party obtains judgment against the
insured in excess of policy limits; (6) the insured assigns All his rights under his policy
to the injured party; (7) the injured party sues the insurance company on the policy;
(8) the court, determining that the company exercised good faith in denying coverage
but erred, holds the insurer liable under the policy. The issue is whether the com-
pany's liability extends beyond the policy limit and, if so, upon what basis.
2. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
3. "Reasonable settlement offers" means offers by the injured party to settle
within policy limits, especially "[wihen there is great risk of a recovery beyond the
policy limits so that the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a set-
tlement which can be made within those limits . . . ." Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
4. Even though Comunale refers to "wrongful" denial of coverage, it makes clear
that "[t]he decisive factor in fixing the extent of ... liability . . . is the refusal to
accept an offer of settlement within the policy limits." Id. Comunale asserts a strict
liability rule based upon "the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing [which]
requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate case although the express terms of the
policy do not impose such a duty." Id. For varied analyses of Comunale, see Note,
Insurance. Duty of Liability Insurer to Accept Offer of Settlement Within Policy Lim-
its, 10 HASTINGS L.. 198 (1958); 47 GEo. L.J. 601 (1959); 57 MicH. L. lv. 775
(1959); 107 U. PA. L. REV. 571 (1959).
5. 325 F. Supp. 1330 (D.S.D. 1971) (mem.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'd on other grounds on rehearing en bane, id. at
1023, rehearings denied, id. at 1015,
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fense upon which it relied to deny coverage." The injured parties sued
the insured in a tort action in which American took no part." Before
obtaining judgments, the plaintiffs offered to settle with American for
49,000 dollars, but American refused.8 Since the state courts had not
interpreted the exclusion American was asserting, the plaintiffs offered
to hold their suit in abeyance until American could file a declaratory ac-
tion to determine whether coverage obtained.9 When American failed
to seek a declaratory judgment, the plaintiffs proceeded with their suit
against the insured in the South Dakota court. The plaintiffs received
over 138,000 dollars in judgments and obtained from the insured an
assignment of his rights against American.'"
The district court permitted recovery against the company but
only to the limits of the policy." Cross appeals went to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals where a three judge panel approved the
"strict liability" rule of Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.'2
and imposed liability on American for the entire judgment returned
against its insured.' On rehearing en banc, a sharply divided court
affirmed.' 4  The three judges who heard the initial appeal adopted
6. 476 F.2d at 1017-18. The insured never applied for coverage of the accident
vehicle. He relied upon a thirty day automatic coverage clause for newly acquired
automobiles, which applied only if at the time of the accident American had insured
"all private passenger and utility automobiles owned by the named insured on the day
of its acquisition." Id. at 1017 (emphasis by the court). The insurance company ar-
gued that on the day the insured acquired the accident vehicle he legally owned a
1959 Oldsmobile, which he had driven for three months without insurance before it
became disabled with engine trouble. Coverage turned upon the district court's finding
"that the 1959 Oldsmobile was not an automobile owned by the named insured within
the meaning of the 'automatic insurance' provisions of the policy ... " 325 F. Supp.
at 1333, ail'd, 476 F.2d at 1017.
7. 325 F. Supp. at 1331; 476 F.2d at 1017.
8. 476 F.2d at 1020.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1017.
11. 325 F. Supp. at 1334. In limiting liability to policy limits, the court reasoned
from Kunkel v. United Security Ins. Co., 84 S.D. 116, 168 N.W.2d 723 (1969), that
liability for damages in excess of policy limits would be conditioned by the South
Dakota Supreme Court "upon a finding that the insurer had exercised bad faith in
rejecting the settlement offer" and "upon a finding that the insurer exercised bad faith
in reaching its decision not to defend." 325 F. Supp. at 1333-34. Kunkel involved
an insurer who had undertaken the defense, thus it is factually distinguishable from
Luke; nevertheless, Kunkel is the authority relied upon in both the district court and
court of appeals opinions. The better interpretation of Kunkel seems to be that, given
the court's emphasis on the jury's determining bad faith from the totality of circum-
stances, it does not foreclose the possibility of finding bad faith for refusing to settle
when preceded by a good faith denial of coverage. This is the dissent's conclusion
in Luke. 476 F.2d at 1026-27.
12. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); see note 4 supra.
13. 476 F.2d at 1022.
14. Id. ;kt 1023.
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their previous opinion, but the three judges concurring in the result
agreed with the three dissenters that the company's excess liability for
refusing to settle should be based upon bad faith in not giving equal
consideration to the insured's interests. Although the dissent urged that
the issue of bad faith was for the jury, the concurring judges found
American "guilty of bad faith in refusing to settle as a matter of law.""
Luke raises two major questions. The first is the method the
concurring judges used to find American guilty of bad faith as a matter
of law when, by all accounts, the company had investigated the
facts, researched the available law, and interpreted its exclusion claim
in a "not unreasonable" way in deciding to deny coverage.10 The
second is the means, short of settlement, American could have em-
ployed to protect itself from excess liability. The answers involve the
manipulation of the link between a good faith denial of coverage and
the duty to settle.
The typical automobile liability policy provides that the insurer
"shall defend . . . any suit against the insured . . .even if such suit
is groundless, false or fraudulent . . . .""I This standard defense
clause clearly imposes a duty to defend, which the company must dis-
charge with due care or be subject to liability for damages in excess of
the policy's coverage.18  With some exceptions, the words "groundless,
false, or fraudulent" refer to suits instituted against the insured stating
allegations which, if true, would come within the scope of policy cov-
erage. Accordingly, a claim outside policy coverage or the insured's
noncompliance with the express conditions in the policy normally per-
15. Id.
16. In finding American had not acted in bad faith as a matter of law by denying
coverage and refusing settlement, the district court cited American's diligence in investi-
gating the facts and interpreting the law. 325 F. Supp. at 1334. In rejecting plain-
tiffs' claim for attorneys' fees, the panel on first appeal incorporated the lower court's
review of American's good faith in denying coverage and found that American's refusal
to pay the plaintiffs as assignees of the insured was neither "vexatious" nor "without
reasonable cause." 476 F.2d at 1022-23. None of the judges on rehearing en bane
challenged American's good faith in refusing to defend and denying coverage.
17. 4 W. FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 2043 (5th ed. 1952);
R. KEaTON, BASIC TEr ON INSURANCE LAW 658 (1971).
18. R. KEETON, supra note 17, at § 7.6(b). Compare Grain Dealers Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 196 So. 2d 650 (La. Ct. App. 1967)
(duty to defend is contractual), with City of Peoria v. Underwriter's at Lloyd's Lon-
don, Unine., 290 F. Supp. 890, 892 (S.D. Ill. 1968) (if the contract "provides that
insurers may, 'if they so desire,' 'take over the conduct ... of the defense of any
claim,'" then a mere right to defend is created and not an obligation). For a dis-
cussion of pitfalls for the insured as well as insurer concerning the duty to defend,
see Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114
U. PA. L. Rnv. 734 (1966).
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mits the company to deny coverage and may remove the duty to de-
fend."" Because courts interpret coverage exclusions "equitably" in-
stead of "functionally," however, insurance carriers are seldom confi-
dent their exclusion defenses will succeed.20  Even so, as long as the
carrier denies coverage in good faith, losing the exclusion argument
ordinarily results in liability limited to the amount of the policy plus
the insured's attorneys' fees and court costs.
21
The standard defense clause also states the responsibilities of the
insurer regarding settlement: " . . . the company shall have the right
to make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or
suit as may be deemed expedient by the company . *... ,22 Al-
though this language indicates insurer discretion, courts have con-
sistently held carriers to a duty to settle within policy limits because of
the insurer's exclusive control of the litigation and its fiduciary rela-
tionship with the insured.23
Even though an insurer has denied coverage, claimants regularly
offer to settle. Since few insureds can satisfy a substantial adverse
judgment, the plaintiff approaches the company in hopes of receiving
some payment. Although settling within policy limits might spare the
carrier extra expenses if its coverage exclusion defense fails and liabil-
ity is imposed up to policy limits, the company's interests normally
dictate refusing settlement. Most offers are barely within policy limits;
moreover, the insurer's exclusion defense may be upheld, absolving the
company of any liability. The insured, on the other hand, always ad-
vocates compromise to avoid litigation and possible personal liability
for damages awarded beyond policy limits. The claimant usually
has nothing to lose by forcing the interests of the insurer and the in-
sured plainly into conflict. If the company settles, the plaintiff fre-
quently gets more than he could realize from the insured. If the com-
19. 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4683 (1962) states the
majority rule: "An insurer's duty to defend an action against the insured is measured,
in the first instance, by allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings, and if such pleadings
state facts bringing the injury within the coverage of the policy, the insurer must de-
fend . . . ." For modifications of this rule, in which the duty to defend remains de-
spite claims being outside the scope of the insurance contract, see R. KEETON, supra
note 17, at § 7.6(a).
20. See E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw § 67 (2d ed. 1957).
21. Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Cas. & Sur. Co., 149 Minn. 482, 184 N.W. 189
(1921), cited by Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d
198, 201 (1958).
22. See authorities cited note 17 supra.
23. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Hv. L.
REv. 1136, 1138 (1954).
1974]
708 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
pany refuses, he has laid the foundation for an excess damages verdict
against it.
Two factors coalesce in determining whether the insurer breaches
it% duty to settle: (1) the basis for imposing liability and (2) the
relative consideration the carrier must give the insured's interests.14
The basis for liability may be bad faith2 5 (the test adopted by the
majority of jurisdictions), negligence,26  or some variant.27  Alter-
natives under the relative consideration factor include the company's
giving either "paramount consideration to the insured's interests,"28 or
"at least equal consideration to the insured's interests,' 2 or "para-
mount consideration to its own interests."3  Nearly all courts adopt
the "at least equal consideration" test so that the prevailing standard
used to judge the insurer's compliance with its duty to settle is that the
carrier must exercise good faith in giving equal consideration to the
insured's interests.3'
The "relative consideration" alternatives of the duty to settle are
24. Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer, 13
VAND. L. REV. 837, 839-42 (1960). See also R. KEETON, supra note 17, at § 7.8(b).
25. E.g., Kohlstedt v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 258 Iowa 337, 139 N.W.2d
184 (1965); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); Wynne-
wood Lumber Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 269, 91 S.E. 946 (1917).
26. E.g., Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A2d 57
(1947); G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1929); cf. Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 55, 188
A.2d 320 (1963).
27. See Keeton, supra note 23, at 1139-48. Concerning stricter standards, see
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
28. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346
(1933); cf. National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Britt, 203 Okla. 175, 200 P.2d 407 (majority
opinion), 218 P.2d 1039 (dissenting opinion) (1948).
29. E.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958); Kunkel v. United Security Ins. Co., 84 S.D. 116, 168 N.W.2d 723 (1969).
30. Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W. 1081
(1916); cf. Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), a! 'd
on rehearing, 204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).
31. In cases where the company has acknowledged coverage, the "good faith-equal
consideration" test has been translated into more workable terms: "[v]ith respect to
the decision whether to settle or try the case, the insurance company must in good
faith view the situation as it would if there were no policy limit applicable to the
claim." Keeton, supra note 24, at 841. Although this characterization gives "equal
consideration" more concreteness, the problem of explaining "good faith" remains,
prompting one judge to complain that "enunciation of the rule is not difficult but its
application is troublesome." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 339, 313
P.2d 404, 406 (1957). Whatever value this working formula has in determining the
duty to settle when the insurer defends, it dissipates when the insurer denies coverage
and refuses to defend, since policy limits would not affect a decision based on absence
of liability altogether. It is this circumstance-a refusal to settle following a good
faith denial of coverage-which makes application of the "good faith-equal considera-
tion" standard most difficult and which provides the setting for Luke.
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particularly important since selecting either extreme carries significant
consequences. Adherence to the "paramount consideration of the in-
surer's interests" standard allows the insurer to resist settlement with
impunity since its interests are against settling. The opposite ex-
treme--"paramount consideration of the insured's interests"-means
always having to settle and "compel[s] the conclusion . . . that the
company is strictly liable for the excess if it refuses a settlement offer
within policy limits. ' 32 Because of these "strictly innocent" or "strictly
liable" results, the middle formula of equal consideration is by far the
prevailing view.
Since the exclusion defenses leading to denying coverage apply with
equal force when settlement is offered, some authority supports the
proposition that a good-faith-though-mistaken denial of coverage sat-
isfies the "good faith-equal consideration" standard of the duty to
settle.38  Emphasizing that insurers need only consider not act upon
the insured's interests, many courts have decided that refusal to settle
based upon a good faith denial of coverage does not extend the com-
pany's liability beyond policy limits.3 4  However, despite an insurer's
good faith denial before rejecting settlement, other courts, also asserting
the "good faith-equal consideration" test, have held the carrier liable
for the entire judgment rendered against the insured. 5 Luke helps
explain these inconsistent rulings by exposing how courts can manipu-
late the link between coverage denial and settlement refusal to shift
the relative consideration standard from "strictly innocent" to "strictly
liable" under the guise of equal consideration. The dissent, in particu-
lar, reveals the key to how this shifting technique operates.
Judge Bright, concurring on the finding of American's coverage
but dissenting on the issue of excess liability, identifies three rules used
32. Keeton, supra note 23, at 1145.
33. See text accompanying note 37 infra. North Carolina adheres to the rule
whereby "an insurer may not be held liable for an honest mistake in judgment, even
if unreasonable," in effecting settlement. Abernethy v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 373 F.2d
565, 568 (4th Cir. 1967) (applying North Carolina law). The requirements for liabil-
ity in North Carolina frequently appear in tandem-acting with wrongful or fraudulent
purpose or with lack of good faith-suggesting that something at least akin to fraud
is necessary to establish bad faith. See Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
173 N.C. 269, 91 S.E. 946 (1917). Accordingly, the insurer's good faith belief that
coverage does not exist should present a strong argument against showing the company
acted with bad faith in refusing settlement.
34. "Undoubtedly this is an attempt to relieve the insurer from the seemingly il-
logical position of having to effect a final settlement when reasonable investigation
indicated no liability on its part for the claim." 57 MICH. L. Rav. 775, 776 (1959).
35. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,- 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958);
Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (Kansas City, Mo., Ct. App. 1965).
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to relate an insurer's good faith denial of coverage to its refusal to
settle: the "insulation" rule, the "strict liability" rule, and the "middle"
rule.
3 6
The dominant feature of the "insulation" rule is the recognition
of a close nexus between a good faith coverage denial and the settle-
ment refusal. In approving this rule, courts-including the district
court in Luke-have reasoned that since the same factor, i.e. a cover-
age exclusion defense, has overriding effect on both the decision to
deny coverage and the decision to refuse settlement, a finding of good
faith as to the former necessitates finding good faith and equal con-
sideration as to the latter.3 7  Denying coverage in good faith "insulates"
the company from excess liability for resisting settlement. The result
is the same as the "paramount consideration of the insurer's interests"
extreme, even though the court proclaims earnest adherence to the
"good faith-equal consideration" test. Once the company finds a de-
fensible reason for denying coverage, it can reject settlement attempts
without risking excess liability.
The "middle" view best preserves the literal meaning of the "good
faith-equal consideration" standard.3 8  This rule appreciates the con-
nection between a good faith coverage denial and refusal to settle but
does not preclude a finding of bad faith regarding settlement. Although
good faith in denying coverage works in the insurer's favor, it is merely
"one of the factors" for the trier of fact in determining bad faith on
the settlement question.39 Under this view, the insurer should at
36. 476 F.2d at 1025.
37. Of the cases cited by Judge Bright in support of the "insulation rule," only
the district court opinion and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Skaggs, 251 F.2d
356 (10th Cir. 1957) seem to preclude a finding of bad faith in refusing to settle
once a good faith denial of coverage has been established. Taken together, the cases
under the "insulation" heading advocate a view whereby a good faith coverage denial
creates a rebuttable presumption that the company exercised good faith in refusing to
settle. While the practical consequences may be tantamount to "insulation," a better
heading for the category would focus on the presumptive, rather than insulating effect§.
In the interest of clarity, however, the text adopts Judge Bright's characterization.
38. By including Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Herman, 405 F.2d 121 (Sth Cir.
1968) in the "middle" view, Judge Bright misconceives the consequences each category
has on the relationship between a good faith denial of coverage and the refusal to
settle. Judge Bright joined in the Herman opinion which upheld the proposition that
a "good faith belief that coverage existed constitutes no excuse for its failure to settle."
Id. at 122. Furthermore, the court of appeals quotes approvingly from the court
below: "The defendant gambled on the question of policy coverage and lost. They [sic]
are required to pay the consequences." Id. As a result Herman properly belongs with
the strict liability cases. See text accompanying notes 41-44 infra.




least steadfastly review the situation whenever confronted with a settle-
ment offer after having denied coverage.
Kunkel v. United Security Insurance Co., the decision relied upon
by the concurring opinion, clearly incorporates into its "good faith-equal
consideration" standard the evidentiary relationship envisioned by the
"middle" view.4" In applying Kunkel, however, the concurring judges
in Luke only adopted the traditional two-step criteria of good faith and
equal consideration and ignored Kunkel's approval of the evidentiary
connection between a good faith denial of coverage and the issue of bad
faith in exercising the duty to settle. The concurring opinion leaves
no room for interpretation:
The effect of this holding is that an insurer who breaches its con-
tract to provide coverage is placed in no better and in no worse
position than if it had assumed coverage when considering whether
it acted in good faith in refusing to settle.41
This is practically verbatim the Comunale or strict liability rule.
4
1
Like the strict liability standard, which expressly approves of the
"equal consideration" test,43 the concurring opinion negates the nexus
between coverage denial and settlement refusal. Its instructions re-
quire the insurance company to put itself in the hypothetical circum-
stance of defending the insured on the merits. Since that hypothet-
ical, by definition, rules out a good faith denial of coverage, the
opinion forbids the insurer, in cases like Luke in which the insured is
clearly at fault in causing the accident, to rely on the only reason it has
for not settling. With its interest obliterated, the company has nothing
with which to balance against the insured's undiminished interest in
having the settlement offer accepted. The real effect of the holding is
to slide "at least equal consideration" to "paramount consideration of
the insured's interests." As noted in the discussion of "relative inter-
ests,"44 the practical consequence of the latter standard is strict liability
whenever an insured rejects a settlement within policy limits and cover-
age is later held to have obtained. Thus, acceptance of a reasonable
offer is mandated.
Luke is a particularly valuable study in the movable link between
denial of coverage and the refusal to settle since all three positions re-
garding the nexus issue were applied at some point in the case. The
40. Id.
41. 476 F.2d at 1023.
42. 50 Cal. 2d at 660, 328 P.2d at'202; see note 4 supra.
43. 50 Cal. 2d at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
44. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
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district court used the "insulation" rule, the dissent on rehearing en
banc used the "middle" or "evidentiary" view, and the concurring opin-
ion used the "strict liability" standard. Not a single judge embraced
anything other than the "good faith-equal consideration" test, yet three
different conclusions resulted. In fairness to judges and litigants alike,
each jurisdiction should identify its position on the relationship between
coverage denial and settlement refusal and make that position explicit as
a third dimension of the "good faith-equal consideration" standard.
Unless a clear declaration is made, the nexus issue can continue to be
an escalator taking courts from "insulation" to "strict liability" under
the banner of "good faith-equal consideration."
Knowing how a court reaches a decision has merit, but perhaps a
more pertinent inquiry for insurers is what they can do to protect them-
selves in a situation like Luke. The concurring opinion implies a solu-
tion in the first reason 45 it gives for finding bad faith as a matter of
law: "[tihe record shows that once the insurer refused coverage it
failed to investigate further .... ,,46 The material facts, however,
were undisputed. The only unresolved issue was how the court
would interpret the coverage exclusion defense; consequently, the only
further investigation the company could have done was in court by
way of declaratory judgment. By implication, the lesson the concurring
judges seem to be impressing upon insurers is to be absolutely certain
before abandoning the insured and only through an adjudication of
rights can that certainty be achieved. Perhaps the concurring opinion
had in mind a rule like the one posed by Country Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Murray:
if the carrier refuses to provide its insured an unrestricted defense,
yet desires to ultimately urge exclusionary coverage defenses, it
must;
(1) Secure a declaratory judgment of its rights and obliga-
tions, while defending its potential insured on a reservation of
rights, or
45. The second reason-not considering the excess damages its insured might suf-
fer-begs the question whether the tortfeasor was in fact the company's insured for
the purposes of the litigation instituted by the injured party and raises the issue whether
the insured has suffered any damages until he actually expends his own resources to
discharge the adverse judgment. For a discussion of recovery by semi-solvent insureds
when there has been a bad faith refusal to settle within policy limits, see Comment,
Bad Faith Failure to Settle Within Policy Limits: Recovery by Semi-Solvent Insureds,
61 GEO. L.I. 1525 (1973); Recent Decision, Insurance-Insurer's Liability for an Ex.
cess Judgement Following a Wrongful Refusal to Settle Within Policy Limits, 22 J.
PmB. L. 271 (1973).
46. 476 F.2d at 1023.
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(2) Defend its potential insured on a reservation of rights
and adjudicate its coverage in a supplemental suit.47
In either instance the insurer can eventually argue its policy defense
without risking excess liability and without abandoning the insured.
Although the declaratory judgment alternative presents difficulties,4"
its possibilities appear brightest in cases like Luke, in which the adjudi-
cation of the insurer's rights has no bearing whatever on the insured's
tortious liability.
If the concurring judges wanted to adopt the procedure outlined
by Murray, they should have done more than merely hint at their de-
sire. Maybe the judges were simply advocating the strict liability rule,
but to avoid Erie problems,49 they reached the same result obliquely.
The debate over the economic consequences of strict liability still
rages, 0 and the expansion of the limited-risk concept of liability insur-
ance in connection with "no fault" has commanded national attention.
Accordingly, one would hope that any attempt to hold insurance car-
riers to greater liability than appears in the contract of insurance would
be done openly rather than through deceptive terminology."
Whatever their intent, the concurring judges have helped to ex-
pose how the relationship between good faith coverage denial and the
duty to settle can be manipulated to protect insurers or to impose
strict liability on them. Surely this movable link should be riveted
into place so that consistent results may be achieved from application
of the "good faith-equal consideration" standard.
WILLIAM RICHARD PURDY
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